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The Logical vs. the Ontological Understanding of Conditions 
Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson 
According to the truth-functional analysis of conditions, to be ‘necessary for’ 
and ‘sufficient for’ are converse relations. From this it follows that to be 
‘necessary and sufficient for’ is a symmetric relation, that is, that if P is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for Q, then Q is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for P. This view is acknowledged to be contrary to common sense. 
In this paper I point out that it is also contrary to a widely accepted 
ontological view of conditions, according to which if P is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for Q, then Q is no sense a condition for P; it is a mere 
consequence of P.  
 
Key words: Necessary and sufficient conditions, Conditionality, Ontology, 
Wertheimer, Causality, Truth-functional analysis 
1. Introduction 
The truth-functional analysis of conditions has undeniably become the standard view of 
conditions even though it is known to suffer from some difficult problems, e.g. that it 
fails to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant conditions; any true statement is a 
necessary condition for any other truth. However, this paper concerns another problem, 
notably, that the truth-functional view depicts the relationship between conditions and 
their consequences as being in a certain sense symmetrical; if p is a necessary condition 
for q, then q is a sufficient condition for p. The truth-functional understanding of 
conditionals conflicts with the common sense view, say, that writing a thesis is necessary 
for getting a degree, but getting a degree is not sufficient for writing a thesis. The degree 
is a mere consequence of the writing. Getting a degree (not to be confused with the 
promise of getting a degree) cannot contribute to the writing, since it is only awarded on 
the condition that the thesis is completed.  
The symmetry between the terms of conditional claims is further strengthened, on the 
truth-functional account, in the case of conditions that are both necessary and sufficient; 
the converse relationship assumed to hold between necessary and sufficient conditions 
entails that if p is a necessary and sufficient condition for q, then q is likewise a necessary 
and sufficient condition for p. This, again, runs counter to the common sense view that 
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lightning is necessary and sufficient for thunder while thunder is in no sense at all a 
condition for lightning. Lightning makes thunder come about, but not vice versa. 
The idea that necessary and sufficient conditions are converse relations has been 
challenged before, e.g. by an appeal to counterexamples. The challenge rests on the 
observation that if the truth-functional analysis is correct, then it should always be 
possible to paraphrase sentences of the form “if p occurs, then q occurs” as “p occurs 
only if q occurs”. One well-known counterexample is “if you touch me, I’ll scream” 
(McCawley 1993, p. 317). It is evident that the speaker does not imply that he will be 
touched only in case he screams, or indeed intend the screaming to be any kind of 
condition for being touched. Hence the sentence cannot be paraphrased as “you touch me 
only if I scream”.  
I think that not only are there the occasional counterexample to the standard view, but 
that in ontology every example can arguably be portrayed as a counterexample. Like 
Roger Wertheimer (1968), I think it is not adequately appreciated that there exists an 
ontological understanding of conditionality that fits to the common sense view, and 
which is incompatible with the truth-functional analysis. The incompatibility between the 
ontological understanding and the truth-functional analysis has been largely overlooked 
in the discussion about conditionals, even though the ontological understanding is often 
implicitly assumed in ontology.  
For instance, it is assumed in the issue on metaphysical necessity that it makes a 
difference whether necessity can be defined in terms of possible worlds or if necessity or 
essence defines possible worlds. Thus it is assumed that it makes a difference whether de 
re modality should be defined in terms of possible worlds in the following way,  
for any entity e, e is essentially F, iff e is F in every world where e exists,  
or if it should be the other way around, 
for any entity e, e is F in every world where e exists, iff e is essentially F.  
On the truth-functional view the two are equivalent and the dispute meaningless. 
It should be mentioned that I presuppose that the truth-functional analysis is not 
intended to be a mere stipulation or analytic definition of conditionality, comparable to 
the definition of what it is to be a perfect circle (which allegedly to not obtain in reality). 
From Metaphysica 9: 129-137 (Author’s Copy) 
 3 
It’s acceptance, as a standard theory of conditionality, at least in ontology, must rest on 
its perceived success in correctly capturing the nature of conditionality (or at the least be 
perceived as the best theory available).  
I should also say that I take the issue about conditionality, in ontology, to revolve 
around the conviction that things just don’t occur in a haphazard manner; that they occur 
only under certain circumstances in a lawful manner. The problem has been to give an 
account of the relationship between the things that occur, and the different part of the 
circumstances that determine whether they occur or not.  
2. The Truth-Functional Understanding of Conditionality and its Limits in Ontology 
There is a basic understanding of conditions that I think everybody agrees upon, and 
which you will find in any textbook in which the notion of condition is explained. This is, 
firstly, that a sufficient condition is something that, if satisfied, guarantees that 
something else obtains; p is a sufficient condition for q if q obtains whenever p obtains; 
i.e. ‘if p then q’. For instance, lightning is a sufficient condition for thunder because 
whenever there is lightning there is also thunder. Secondly, that a necessary condition is 
something that must be satisfied in order for something else to be true; p is a necessary 
condition for q if q cannot obtain without p, i.e. ‘q only if p’. For instance, lightning is a 
necessary condition for thunder, because unless there is lightning there will not be 
thunder. Finally, a necessary and sufficient condition is something that, if satisfied, 
guarantees that something else obtains, and is the only thing to do that; p is a necessary 
and sufficient condition of q if q obtains whenever p obtains and only when q obtains; i.e. 
‘q if and only if p’. For instance, lightning is both necessary and sufficient for thunder, 
because there is always thunder when there is lightning and only then.  
However, according to the truth-functional analysis, ‘necessary for’ and ‘sufficient 
for’ are converse relations, i.e. it depicts ‘if p then q’ as equivalent to ‘p only if q’, and 
likewise ‘q only if p’ as equivalent to ‘if q then p’. This entails in its turn that ‘p iff q’ is 
equivalent with ‘q iff p’. Accordingly, on the truth-functional analysis, thunder is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for lightning just as much as lightning is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for thunder.  
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The mutual conditionality between lightning and thunder, as depicted by the truth-
functional view, doesn’t comply well with either common sense or with what physics 
tells us about the nature of lightning, i.e. about the conditions under which lightning and 
thunder occur, respectively. Physically, thunder is explained as being the sound 
(vibrations in the air) produced by a surge of electricity between negatively and 
positively charged portions of humid air, i.e. thunder is explained in terms of the effects 
of a lightning. In other words, in order for thunder to occur, there must first occur a 
lightning, but thunder is not a part of the conditions that need to obtain in order for 
lightning to strike; thunder is a mere consequence of lightning. 
As for common sense, the relation between conditions and consequences are clearly 
asymmetrical. An ordinary person saying ‘I would have caught the bus if I had finished 
sooner’ is talking about consequences of her actions (she missed the bus), and how things 
could have turned out different as a consequence of having acted otherwise (she would 
have caught the bus). Her claim is not equivalent to the claim that ‘I had finished sooner 
if I would have caught the bus’ as if her catching the bus could have somehow made her 
finish sooner. Catching the bus could not have made her finish sooner, because she would 
have had to finish sooner first in order to catch the bus; simply put, catching or missing 
the bus is a mere consequence of when she finishes her job and not a condition at all for 
when she finishes her job (of course, her intention of catching the bus could persuade her 
to finish sooner, but the act of actually catching the bus could not have made her finish 
sooner). 
The important distinction here is that whereas lightning is a necessary and sufficient 
part of the circumstances that allow the occurrence of thunder then thunder is not a part 
of the circumstances that allow lightning. Obviously, this reasoning is dependent on 
bringing in causal considerations, in particular it is dependent on a conception of 
causality that is compatible with the idea that causes produce their effects, i.e. bring them 
into existence. But then again, that causes produce their effects is at the heart of the 
common sense conception of conditionality, it is about the causes that make some things 
come about and the circumstances that must obtain in order for the cause to be effective.  
On a roughly Humean interpretation of causation, lightning and thunder are events 
that happen to always occur in pairs, and whose repeated observation ‘produces’ a 
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cognitive connexion between the idea of lightning and of thunder, which makes us 
always expect to hear thunder when we see lightning. For the sake of argument, I will 
happily concede that the truth-functional analysis is perfectly compatible with a 
consistent Humean interpretation of causality, and continue to merely argue for its 
incompatibility with the idea that some circumstances make possible the coming into 
existence of certain occurrences, while other make this coming into existence inevitable. 
3. The Ontological Understanding of Conditionality 
The truth-functional understanding of conditions is the received view of conditions in 
contemporary philosophy. However, in a certain brand of realist ontology, and in 
common sense, the idea of a mutual relationship between conditions and consequents is 
alien. The term ‘necessary and sufficient condition’ is there applied to a certain type of 
conditions, notably those that are both necessary and sufficient for the consequent, or for 
a conjunction of antecedents that jointly are necessary and sufficient for the consequent, 
but where the consequent is not a condition for the antecedent at all:  
a (or a1, a2...an) is necessary and sufficient for the existence of b, but b is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of a (or a1, a2...an). 
According to the realist view in question, ontology does not primarily deal with 
statements and/or propositions and their relations, but with the basic structure of the 
world, the nature of the kinds of entities that inhabit it, and the relationships between 
them.  
Furthermore, it treats the truth of statements about reality as dependent on the nature 
of the reality these statements they are about, because it considers the truth of these 
statements to be a consequence of their correspondence to facts. Contingent truth, 
according to this view, is a property that cannot be possessed solely in virtue of truth-
value links that hold between propositions independently of the relations of ontological 
determination that exist in the world. True, if ‘there is thunder’ is true, then ‘there has 
been lightning’ is also true, but not because the truth of ‘there is thunder’ itself warrants 
the truth of ‘there has been lightning’ in virtue of a truth-value link, but because as a 
matter of fact every thunder is produced by lightning. There is a truth-value link between 
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‘there is lightning’ and ‘there is thunder’, because there is a causal link between lightning 
and thunder. 
According to the ontological view, a merely necessary condition is something, a, 
whose existence is required for it to be possible for something else, b, to come about. The 
condition a may itself not be enough to actually produce b. For a window to break when a 
brick hits it with a certain force F, it is necessary that the window is fragile (a bullet proof 
glass would not break). It is therefore a necessary condition for the breaking that the 
window is fragile, but fragility itself never breaks any windows, hence it is not sufficient.  
A merely sufficient condition is something which always and invariably produces the 
consequent, but which may not be the only thing to do just that. A brick hitting a window 
with the force F may be sufficient for the breaking of a fragile window, and therefore 
invariably results in a broken window, but so can a blow by a baseball-bat and many 
other things as well. Hence, the hitting of a fragile window by a brick with the force F is 
not a necessary condition; it could be broken by something else. A necessary and 
sufficient condition, in ontology, is something whose occurrence always and invariably 
produces a certain consequence and is the only thing to do just that.  
Whether there really exists anything which is both a necessary and sufficient 
condition is a controversial matter in ontology, and the controversy of this issue coincides 
with the controversy of the characterisation of causes as necessary and sufficient for their 
effects, i.e. it coincides with the search for a necessary connexion between cause and 
effect. Consequently, any suggested example of a necessary and sufficient condition will 
be controversial. Perhaps the least controversial example of a single occurrence that is 
both necessary and sufficient would be The Big Bang. It is, arguably, a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the present state of the universe. But usually we have two or more 
conditions that each are either merely necessary or merely sufficient, but together they 
are necessary and sufficient for the existence of the consequent, e.g. as suggested in 
Mackie’s analysis of causation in terms of INUS conditions (1965).  
However, despite the controversy concerning the reality of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, then, in ontology, consequents are never assumed to be something whose 
existence is required for the existence of the condition. The condition is something that 
must be able to obtain in some way prior to (perhaps not always temporally prior, granted 
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the possibility of simultaneous and backward causation) and independently of the 
consequent. A lightning is in no way enabled by thunder, even though it may perhaps 
always produce thunder. Not even backwards causation is a counterexample to this thesis. 
Backwards causation, if it were shown to occur, would only be a counterexample to the 
thesis that conditions must always precede their consequences in time, but not to the 
thesis that the condition is something that must be able to obtain in some way 
independently of the consequence. 
The notion of condition and consequence, as they are used in ontology, are, I admit, 
to some extent intuitive, and their precise determination would require us to settle the 
controversy regarding a number of ontological issues, in particular causality. But I do 
think our intuitive understanding of them is adequate to the task of discussing the 
difference between necessary and sufficient conditions in the logical and ontological 
sense.  
There is then in the notion of ontological condition the idea that the condition is 
existentially nondependent on the consequent, while the consequent is existentially 
dependent on the condition (see Bunge 1959: p. 38 & 39; Wertheimer 1968). Please note 
that this does not necessarily mean that the condition is temporally prior to the 
consequence, just that the existence of the condition must be made possible by something 
other than the consequent. It could for instance be argued that vibrations in the air are 
produced at the very same time as there is a surge of electricity, and yet it is the surge of 
electricity that produces the vibrations and not vice versa. 
Also note that ‘condition for’ or a ‘consequence of’, like ‘necessary for’ and 
‘sufficient for’ is relational. No contingent state of affairs is a condition without being 
itself a consequence of something else. However, it cannot be a consequence of the very 
consequence for which it is a condition. If condition and consequence are existential 
conditions for each other, then either both must always have existed (in which case it is 
not clear in which sense they are existential conditions), or neither could ever exist 
(because neither could come into existence to make the existence of the other possible 
unless the other already existed). There is a third possibility, notably that both come into 
existence together. But, then there must surely have been a condition c for the coming 
into existence of a and b, and if conditions are always mutual then c must also have come 
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into existence together with a and b; an infinite regress arises leading to the conclusion 
that everything must have come into existence together in an initial unconditioned act of 
creation. Again, this reasoning assumes that it makes sense to talk about entities as 
coming into existence, since the idea of existential conditions makes no clear sense in an 
eternalistic universe where everything exists in parity. 
4. Conditionality and Causality 
The relation between cause and effect is the paradigmatic example of a conditional 
relationship. The effect is for its existence dependent upon the occurrence of the cause, 
while the cause is not dependent for its existence upon the occurrence of the effect 
(however, the cause is surely dependent on some other prior condition). Paul has stomach 
pains because he ate too much cake, but he did not eat too much cake because he has 
stomach pains. The effect is a consequence of the cause, but not vice versa. Striking a 
ball with a tennis-racket is what makes the ball cross the net, while the crossing of the net 
by a ball is not what makes the ball being struck.  
There is a relationship between our knowledge about conditions and knowledge about 
consequences, which may be taken to imply a mutual relationship between the truth of 
statements about conditions and consequences. We can draw inferences about the truth of 
statements about conditions on the basis of our knowledge about the truth of statements 
about consequences. That the ball crosses the net might give us reason to think it had 
been struck (and hence to believe that ‘the ball has been struck’ is true). Consequently the 
truth of ‘the ball crosses the net’ may be thought to be a condition for the truth of ‘the 
ball has been struck’, in an epistemological sense. However, that does not make the 
crossing of the net by the ball an ontological condition for the striking of the ball.  
The Big Bang (as far as we know) is the necessary and sufficient condition for the 
present state of the universe, but the present state of the universe is not in any way a 
condition for the occurrence of the Big Bang. The Big Bang existed long before the 
present state of the universe came into existence. The present state of the universe (+ 
knowledge of the laws of nature) may be a condition for us knowing about the Big Bang 
(and hence to believe that ‘the universe started in a Big Bang’ is true), but the present 
state of the universe did not in any way make it possible for the Big Bang to occur. Even 
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if the effect is inevitable, given the cause, so that cause and effect always occur together, 
then it is the cause which is thought to produce the effect and not vice versa. Instead of 
the effect being a necessary condition for the cause, in those cases, it is a necessary 
consequence of the cause. 
The fact that necessary and sufficient conditions have a necessary consequence, and 
that therefore condition and consequence always occur together, may be what invites the 
identification of conditional relationships with biconditionals. Consider the following 
description of causality: ‘if C occurs then (and only then) E always and invariably 
follows’ (Bunge 1959, p. 47). Given this description of causality, then whenever it is the 
case that C, it will also be the case that E, and whenever it is not the case that C, then it 
will not be the case that E. Hence two statements about the existence of C and E will 
always either be both true or both false. But this symmetrical truth-functional relationship 
between the truth-values of statements about C and E is here depicted on the ontological 
level as a consequence of a relationship of asymmetric existential dependency between C 
and E, a relationship whose asymmetrical nature the biconditional completely fails to 
capture.  
Galileo Galilei, which was allegedly the first to define a cause as being the necessary 
and sufficient condition for its effect, wrote: “that and no other is to be called cause, at 
the presence of which the effect always follows, and at whose removal, the effect 
disappears” (cited by Bunge in (1959; p. 33). He did not say, as far as I know, that the 
effect is therefore a necessary condition for the cause in the sense that there has to be an 
effect before the cause can possibly come about, or that if the effect is removed the cause 
disappears.  
Galileo’s analysis of causality can be much weakened without losing the basic 
asymmetry of the relationship between conditions and consequences, e.g. as in Mackie’s 
analysis of causation in terms of INUS conditions (1965). According to Mackie, a causal 
nexus is a complex of conditions, each of which are singularly insufficient but necessary 
for the cause, but which together constitute an unnecessary but sufficient condition for 
the effect. An electric spark may be a necessary condition for a fire in the attic, but 
insufficient in the absence of flammable material to be ignited. Together an electric spark 
and flammable material may be jointly sufficient for a fire, but unnecessary in the sense 
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that the fire could have been started by other means (e.g. by an arsonist with match-
sticks). On Mackie’s account as well, the effect is a consequence of the given conditions, 
and not in any sense a condition for the very conditions that brought it about.  
Other generic relationships fall into the same mould. Parents are the condition for the 
existence of their children, but children are not the condition for the existence of their 
parents. The parents could never have met and/or never conceived of children together, or 
at least not conceived those particular children, and yet existed, while the children could 
not have been conceived by any other parents. Of course, the individuals that are here 
described as ‘parents’ would not have the relational property of being ‘parents’ unless 
they had children, but the individual people involved are not for their existence dependent 
on the children, and they could have become parents by producing other children than 
they in fact did.  
There have been thinkers in the past who have argued that the causal relation is 
symmetric, i.e. that the effect is just as much a condition for its cause as the cause is a 
condition for its effects, e.g. Hegel (1873: pp. 215ff) and J.M.E. McTaggart (1915). On 
closer scrutiny it turns out that theses thinkers are not concerned with the ontological 
relation between causes and effects in the physical world, but with the logical relation 
between the concept of ‘cause’ and concept of ‘effect’, or between the concepts of 
particular causes and effects, like ‘parent’ and ‘offspring’. The relationship between the 
concept of ‘cause’ and the concept of ‘effect’ is mutual, according to Hegel, because an 
event would not be conceived of as a ‘cause’ unless it was conceived as having an effect, 
and vice versa (1873: p. 215).  
McTaggart even argues that because it is not necessary that a person is drunk if he has 
been drinking (drinking does not imply drunkenness), but it is necessary that he has been 
drinking if he is drunk (drunkenness implies drinking), then drunkenness is really the 
cause to the drinking and not vice versa (1915). The entire explanation of course neglects 
entirely the physiological account of the effects of alcohol consumption, and focuses only 
on the relation of implication between concepts.  
To focus on the contents of concepts in our everyday conceptual scheme, follows 
naturally from McTaggart’s and Hegel’s idealist philosophy, according to which there is 
no material world only mental content. But, if one does not accept their idealist approach, 
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which I certainly do not, one should at least clearly distinguish between conceptual and 
ontological relationships, and take into account what empirical science tells us about the 
nature of physical objects.  
There can be, then, mutual conceptual dependencies, between concepts, e.g. between 
conceptual pairs like ‘parent/offspring’, ‘cause/effect’ in which case an understanding of 
one term requires an understanding of the other. To conceive of someone as being a 
‘parent’ is impossible without conceiving of him as having ‘offspring’, and no one is 
conceived as an ‘offspring’ without being at the same time conceived of as having a 
‘parent’. There are also relations of semantic equivalence between expressions with the 
same propositional content, i.e. expressions that have the same truth-conditions. ‘John is 
a bachelor’ is equivalent to saying that ‘John is an unmarried man’. But, ontologically 
speaking, the conditional relationship between living parents and their living offspring is 
not mutual in this way.  
All in all, the idea that necessary and sufficient conditions are asymmetrically related 
to their consequences pervades ontology. Not just in the philosophy of causation but in 
the philosophy of generic relationships in general. For instance, the idea is present in the 
notion of one-sided existential dependency; the idea that some things are for their 
existence dependent on something, but not vice-versa. Husserl was allegedly one of the 
first to introduce the notion of one-sided existential dependence. Eugenie Ginsberg 
(1931) later attempted to further develop his account and again Kit Fine in (1995). It has 
been used in the construction of so-called level ontologies, e.g. by Nicolai Hartmann 
(1949), Mario Bunge (1973), and Ingvar Johansson (1989). E.J. Lowe, has also recently 
argued for the existence of such a relation (1998, chapter 6). The distinction between the 
logical and ontological understanding of conditionals is therefore of vital importance for 
most ontological matters. 
5. A Final Word 
It might be objected that the above may perhaps provide some reasons to reconsider the 
viability of the truth-functional account of conditionality, but that it does not give a clear 
alternative account of what a condition or a consequence is. I should then point out that I 
am not really suggesting that conditions should be understood in a different ontological 
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sense than is already presupposed in the truth-functional account. The truth-functional 
account presupposes, e.g. that a sufficient condition is something that, if satisfied, 
guarantees that something else obtains; ‘if p then q’. This is not a logical truth, but a 
generalisation of an ontological thesis. Indeed, the notions ‘obtains’ and ‘guarantees’, not 
forgetting ‘true’, in light of which ‘if p then q’ makes sense, are as intuitive in this 
context as are ‘causes’, ‘determines’, ‘condition’ or ‘consequence’.  
Likewise the truth-functional view presupposes that a necessary condition is 
something that must be satisfied in order for something else to be true; ‘q only if p’. 
Finally, it presupposes that a necessary and sufficient condition is something that, if 
satisfied, guarantees that something else obtains, and is the only thing to do that; ‘q if and 
only if p’.  
I have no qualms with the above characterisation of conditionality, because it is 
perfectly in accordance with the ontology of causality and existential dependence. 
Indeed, I think it is derived from ontology. What I object to is the idea that that a logical 
truth-table analysis can then be used to tell us that, ontologically speaking, ‘necessary 
for’ and ‘sufficient for’ are converse relations, and that ‘necessary and sufficient for’ is a 
symmetric relation, independently of any ontological considerations. 
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